Inspired by feminist legal theory and postcolonial literal studies this article interrogates the 'transitional justice discourse' and coins critiques which re-examine the discipline's key tenets; namely, democracy, liberalism, rule of law and human rights. It argues that while transitional justice can be seen as one of the masculine human rights strategies that are reminiscent of imperial intervention in the lives of postcolonial subjects, it is open to seizure by the same. This is possible in transitional contexts since these situations create opportunities for stakeholders to rethink the inadequacies of the accepted discourse, and to subscribe to new ways of seeking justice.
Introduction
[S] ome of us, who adopted more radical approaches, albeit still withinWestern traditions, did not perhaps subscribe wholly to Thompson's thesis that the rule of law was an 'unqualified good'. Yet we, too, saw in bourgeois law and legality, space for struggle to advance the social project of human liberation and emancipation. Law, we argued, was a terrain of struggle. 1 International law has distinguished liberal democracy as the ideal embodiment of national governance for societies making the transition from war or authoritarianism towards peace, rule of law and respect for human rights. 2 In such a passage, international law has also prescribed that societies ought to adopt a variety of measures for, inter alia, restoring the rule of law, in tandem with reforming tainted institutions, repairing the past, reconciling divided communities and preventing future human rights abuses. 3 Further, international law has demanded that a gender perspective ought to be mainstreamed in all transitional justice approaches. 4 Since most alleged dictatorships and the majority of wars that international legal scholars have focused on have been in former European colonies, it is those states that frequently resort to transitional justice, albeit, with limited success.
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In the plentitude of treatises on transitional justice, oddly limited assiduity has been put to the issue of the imperial origins and bias of international law and how this might be a major contributor to postcolonial societies' failure to meet the goals of their transitional justice endeavors. 6 A recent comparative study conducted by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) on the experiences of a number of Sub-Saharan African countries' transitional justice processes pins the limitations of these attempts on the shortcomings of those states' institutions. 7 These states' colonial heritage is a mere footnote to this thesis, particularly noted as one of the factors that contribute to institutional weakness. 8 On this note, and in relation to the African postcolonial state, John Mukum Mbaku attributes institutional failure to an elite driven constitutional legal framework which lacks local legitimacy as it enshrines the values of former colonial masters and not those of the local communities which those rulers sought to govern. 9 The euphoria of independence is said to have prompted Africans to suspend representative constitutional making until their liberation and the acquirement of government machinery by the local elite. Democratic constitutionalism, that is, involving local stakeholders in the reconstruction of a new constitutional order is therefore seen as key to allaying citizens' perceptions of their laws and institutions as foreign precepts intended for their exploitation and marginalization. 10 The participatory constitutionalism argument is inconclusive and can even be said to be self-contradictory since the postcolonial state is itself a creature of colonialism, formally liberated but mostly dependent on former colonial masters for aid, external trade and foreign investment. Most of the postcolonial states did not exist before colonialism. Consequently, their boundaries are those which were carved by the former colonial masters during colonialism. 12 These states are also likely to be governed by elites schooled in western philosophies and languages. crisis of legitimacy. 16 This role is paradoxically since in its implementation, international law has been critiqued by feminist and postcolonial scholars for being based on self-interest, illegitimate, masculine and predisposed towards power. 17 Against this background, this article contests claims to universality by Eurocentric, masculine, elitist and peremptory accounts which dominate the legal scholarship that form the normative basis for transitional justice. 18 In doing so, it derives inspiration from postcolonial legal theory taking into cognizance relevant feminist concerns. 1 9 Postcolonial legal theory is a discourse of resistance which confront the colonial strategy of othering by countering it with the narratives, histories and personal anecdotes of the colonized.
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Of course, postcolonial legal theory is neither fully developed nor monolithic and this work does not claim profound eruditeness on the subject. 21 Rather, it draws insight from those postcolonial legal theorists whose ambitions are to revolutionalize international law from being a discourse of oppression to one of liberation. 22 The article proceeds as follows. Section 2, presents the conventional notion that transitional justice's final ends are liberalization, democratization, strengthening the rule of law and the socialization of human rights norms. Section 3 introduces feminist interventions, successes and controversies. Section 4 provides an overview of postcolonial legal theory and its relevance to the subject matter. And finally, Section 5 attempts to present a postcolonial legal feminist understanding of transitional justice.
Why Transitional Justice?
Transitional justice has come to presage an array of legal and political processes that are employed to undo a past and build a better future in the passage from war to peace or authoritarian rule to democracy. 23 An understanding of the 'transition' and justice' parts of the term can help in shedding some light on the aims of transitional justice. The writer is aware that a similar analysis has been made to try and address disagreements which persist in academia on the timing of and the choice of mechanisms which constitute the field of transitional justice.
24
These questions have stirred the interests of lawyers, historians, anthropologists and political scientists alike. 25 One could cynically state that there was historically a tacit arrangement between lawyers and non-legal social scientists that since the former belong to the field of justice they should confine their efforts to that area. 26 This is evidenced by the paucity in legal writing on the 'transition' part of 'transitional justice' which Christine Bell cynically refers to as the colonisation of law by other disciplines. 27 Thus, the discussion below draws on writings by political scientists for clarity on the definition of 'transition. 28 This article will not address the question of which mechanisms make up the field of transitional justice nor will it address issues of timing. It restricts itself to an analysis of democratisation which the dominant literature considers to be the final aim of transitional justice.
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In this regard the article adapts Pablo De Greiff's normative conception of transitional justice. 30 De Greiff states that whereas providing recognition to victims and fostering civic trust are the two urgent goals of transitional justice, the long term goals are democratisation and reconciliation.
31 This critique will focus on one of the final goals of transitional justice, namely, democratisation. Hopefully, future postcolonial feminist critiques will cover the other three goals. The classical political science definition of transition is that of O'Donnel et al's which is to the effect that transition occurs within a circumscribed duration linking two regimes -an authoritarian regime and a liberal democratic dispensation. 33 The idea of transition as being a bounded period that separates two regimes does however not sit well with those mechanisms which are adopted long after the shift from one political regime to another. This has led to a dissident contention that 'transition' is not just a bounded period that separates two regimes but a unique journey without a marked destination. 34 It is contended that although transitions can be perceived as sustained processes, the focus is mainly on constitutive historical periods, for example Chile after the rule of General Augusto Pinochet in 1990, 3 Political scientists have also noted that transitions are not peculiar to nondemocratic regimes. 39 They have drawn a distinction between a transition to democracy and a transition to a consolidated democracy. 40 Further parallels have been made between a democratic government and a democratic regime. 4 1 'Regime' is said to be an expansive term that refers to both formal and informal rules that govern the way major actors interact in the political system.
Transition
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Related academic polemics on this issue cannot be exhausted in this limited study. Notable ones include debates on the distinction between liberalization and democracy and debates about the concept of democracy itself. 43 This article does not seek to delve into all these political theories but works from the premise that there are two kinds of democracy, namely, procedural and substantive democracy.
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The working understanding of a procedural liberal democracy is that it has three characteristics. 45 The first feature is that the principal route to an office whether legislative or presidential ought to be through free and fair elections. The second one is the idea that those elections ought to take place in an environment where there is a broad universal suffrage; exclusions should be 36) The literature on this subject is too vast to be fully referenced here see for example, gener- justifiable. An example of a condonable debarment could be that of the mentally unsound and criminals. Thirdly, there ought to be guarantees for human rights for all, including women and minorities. 46 Substantive democracy is understood as a scheme whereby 'the general public' redefines the very makeup of the government. 47 This entails the basic rights of citizens, prescribes their ideas of justice, and encompasses understandings on property rights amongst other entitlements and duties. 48 This is the type of democracy that poses more challenges in most transitional societies.
Liberalization is understood as freedom from repression and the socialization of human rights norms within an authoritarian establishment. 49 Thus the working definition for liberal democracy is not confined to mere demands for elections but the requirement that human rights ought to be respected, protected and fulfilled. There has been a vast amount of literature produced by political scientists on this issue. Those relevant to this article are the contributions which sought to explain the relationship between the type of transition and the justice mechanisms employed. Perhaps the most authoritative discussion on the subject is Huntington's distinctions between responses in transitions led by the elite of an old regime (transformations), those forced by the opposition force on the elite (replacements), transitions that are a result of negotiated settlements (transplacements) and those that have been imposed by foreign nations. 51 Huntington asserts that 'the distribution of power during and after transition and not moral considerations have a greater bearing on the mechanisms that a country or region employs in the aftermath of a conflict.
5 2 For example, the possibility of prosecution often presents itself in transitions where the authoritarian regime has totally collapsed and has been replaced by the opposition and not where the old regime's elite plays a significant role in the transitional process. Ibid. As this implies, the legal responses employed in the aftermath of a conflict are a product of the political transformation. 54 This understanding can be contrasted with the idealist perspective that bases transitional legal responses on universal notions of justice. 55 An elaborate discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this section of which the main interest in the work of political scientists is in seeking clarification of concepts.
56 A much more structured discussion on the role of law in transition will be reverted to below in the analysis of legal renditions on the subject. Thus, they argue, with the aid of human rights provisions on derogations and applicable humanitarian standards, 'that existing transitional justice discourses combine at least two kinds of transitions -that from -authoritarianism to democracy and that from war to peace,. 67 They state that the case of Northern Ireland, a 'conflicted democracy' involves a move from war to peace and is not a 'paradigmatic' case of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. It involves an advancement of democracy rather than its launch.68 An alternative perspective might be to draw a distinction between a regime and a government, that is, to treat the broadly democratic United Kingdom government and the Northern Ireland regime as two separate political establishments. To the extent that the informal and formal rules governing the main political actors in Northern Ireland were incompatible with contemporary procedural democratic standards, the Northern Ireland regime could be said to have been authoritarian. For example, the Ulster Unionist Party was accused of gerrymandering electoral borders and introducing voting rights based on economic status. 69 Consequently the elections in the polity were not free and fair and there was no universal suffrage, as the exclusions, which were largely sectarian could not be said to be justifiable.
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One can also draw from political scientists' distinction between the move to democracy and the consolidation of democracy. 71 The Northern Ireland experience does however have some distinguishing features. In Kritz's case studies no analysis was made of regimes that were moving out of colonial rule or rule by foreign powers (transitioning to independence), or those countries whose problems could be attributed to a failure of decolonization (an issue that is a concern of this work). 73 Northern Ireland would not indeed fit the paradigmatic model since the conflict is not an internal conflict in the strict sense. It is a conflict that is peculiar to post-colonial societies, where there is even a conflict about the conflict itself (metaconflict). 74 Thus this work construes Northern Ireland as a good example of how the hazards of decolonization continue to have an influence on postcolonial societies.
These nuances however, do not wholly contest the notion that liberalization and democratization are transitional end goals. 75 Since democracy is said to be contingent on the law, legal scholars focus on the legality of the outgoing regime's actions. 76 Closely tied to this issue is the question of the role played by the law in the passage to a liberal-democratic state.
77
A post-transition regime's illegitimacy is evident in the general discontent within the population, with its laws and institutions. 78 It is also usually characterized by wide-spread and largely state orchestrated human rights abuses. Often, the state does not acknowledge the existence of these human rights abuses. Instead of respecting the rule of law, it 'rules by law' seeing the law as imposing obligations on the citizens and not on the regime itself. 80 In view of this outlined complicity of the law in periods of repression, legal undertakings in transitional times are complex. 81 This issue has been traditionally explored from realist, idealist, critical and liberal theoretical perspectives which largely focus on the relationship between law and politics. 8 2 Ruti
Teitel however, has adopted a pragmatic approach, which points out that there is a dialectical relationship between law and politics in transitional times.
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Law in times of transition is not just a product of political change, it, actually provides a framework for the transition. 84 As Teitel notes:
[L]aw is caught between the past and the future, between backward looking and forwardlooking, between retrospective and prospective. Transitions imply paradigm shifts in the conception of justice; thus law's function is inherently paradoxical. In its ordinary social function, law provides order and stability, but in extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law maintains order, even as it enables transformation. Ordinary predicates about law simply do not apply. In dynamic periods of political flux, legal responses generate a suigeneris paradigm of transformative law.
Thus, while heralding and sticking to the new liberal regime's undertaking to abide by democratic and rule of law principles, law in transitional contexts authenticate a demarcation between the outgoing regime and the new dispensation. 86 Since domestic law is often politicized, international human rights law, by virtue of its supposedly neutrality and externality to the conflict, plays a significant role in otherwise issues of national sovereignty. 87 It preserves the ordinary meaning of the rule of law, which entails notions of continuity and certainty that are often absent in the outgoing regime.
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Indeed, human rights law structures transitions in three different ways. Firstly, it provides the normative basis for political transformation. Issues of justice crop up in different contexts. 93 In the case of transitional justice it is within the situation of a new regime coming into power by replacing a former repressive one. 94 The outgoing administration often has a legacy of human rights violations. 95 This explains why the vast literature on the subject has focused on different mechanisms for combating impunity.
96 However a number of key studies spread across different disciplines are of the view that justice' in a transitional context incorporates a totality of reform strategies that deal with the previous regime's injustices.
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According to the political scientist Nancy Fraser, one of the major dilemmas of justice projects is in striking a balance between commitments to redistribution and recognition.
9 8 Thus within the context of transitional justice, 'justice'
as recognition may involve prosecutions, the creation of truth commissions or commissions of inquiry whose role is to recognize and acknowledge the atrocities of the past regime. property or land rights and can symbolically redistribute shame, from the victim to the perpetrator. 1 0 0 Much more broadly and directly, Rama Mani has addressed the justice theory' in a post conflict dispensation. 101 She identifies rectificatory, legal and distributive justice as the three dimensions of justice that must all be pursued at the transitional moment.
10 2 Rectificatory justice concerns redress for the explicit human outcomes of conflict structured in gross human rights abuses, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other injustices inflicted upon human beings. 10 3 Legal justice addresses the notion of the establishment of the rule of law that often loses its legitimacy, deteriorates or is destroyed both during and after a conflict. 10 4 Distributive justice focuses on economic and political inequalities, which are seen as the root causes of most conflicts. 10 5 This is in line with Ruti Teitel's expansive approach to the discourse, which delineates criminal justice, historic justice, reparatory justice, transitional constitutionalism, and legislative and administrative responses as various legal approaches to injustices in the passage from repression to a liberal democracy. 10 6 She stated that:
[A]djudications of the rule of law construct understandings of what is fair and just.
Criminal, administrative, and historical investigations establish past wrongdoing. Reparatory projects vindicate rights generated by past wrongs to victims as well as to the broader society. Transitional constitutionalism and administrative justice reconstruct the parameters of the changing political order in a liberalization direction.
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This begs the question of why particular justice' mechanisms are preferred over others. Perhaps the answer can be explained by Ruti Teitel's genealogy of transitional justice. 108 This genealogy is structured in three phases; firstly, the post-World War II period in which international criminal justice was invoked to deal with war crimes; secondly, the end of the Cold War where transitional justice was tied to various nation-building projects and thirdly, the contemporary era where the instability associated with globalisation has normalised transitional justice. 10 9 Justice mechanisms currently adopted are a conflation of the Nuremberg legacy of international accountability and the second 100) Ibid Ibid. phase's democratisation that focused on the rule of law applicable to political communities and local perspectives. 110 Thus, the type of justice adopted is linked to the appropriate definitive political context. 1 On this note, cognisance ought to be made of Fletcher and Weistern's arguments that justice needs to be both cemented on and focused on the communities, cultures and contexts of the regime in transition.
11 2 Put simply, justice' in transitional justice is largely dependent on context of the past injustices of the transitioning regime.
11 3
Feminist Interventions, Successes and Limitations
Feminist expositions
Critical advances have been made by feminist scholars and activists in presenting women as objects and victims of a discourse which was originally conceptualized by men. 114 With regards to women as objects of transitional justice, it has been pointed out that whereas in most societies women actively participate during the war or in the fight against dictatorship, this role is weakened in transitional times when returning to conventional practice entails the restoration of patriarchal values.
11 5 Thus women's concerns can be factored in by ensuring that women sit and participate in negotiating tables that deliberate on the transition to an acceptable regime.
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Feminists have underscored how foundational transitional justice concepts presuppose male citizens thereby excluding women. Notwithstanding the inequalities and historical injustices, the liberal understandings of the rule of law were invoked to deny redistribution.
The rule of law has been presented as premised on male notions of law and governance hence the failure by the envisaged liberal democratic state to liberate women.
11 9 Similarly, and in relation to women as victims, human rights law is said to be primarily concerned with offering protection from state encroachment in areas that relate to men instead of ensuring the inherent human dignity of all. 120 For example, human rights violations that often dominate transitional justice mechanisms include forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and torture. 121 Notwithstanding the gravity of these atrocities, along with their possible female victims, focus on these violations fails to deal with the fundamental scope of human rights violations that women face.
1 22 These may include uneven pain caused by internal displacement, loss of a family member and violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Cultural or difference feminists, in particular, stress that the human rights system has to take into account women's difference from men in at least three areas.
1 24 Firstly, women's biological difference to men makes them more vulnerable to sexual violence and other acts of violence.
125 Their parturition and breastfeeding role concentrates their activities in the home. 1 26 Consequently, women are less involved in public life. 127 On this note, feminists decry the masculinity of international law which focuses on incidents of violence in the public sphere, yet as Fionnuala Ni Aolain cautions, women's experiences of violence are in both private and public realms. 118) See the discussion in Nesiah, supra n. 6, at 8o9-8ii. Secondly, not only do feminists aim at breaching the public/private dichotomy, they also object to the hierarchy of rights. 129 Identifying violations of economic, social and cultural rights as being central to women, they want them to be accorded the same status as civil and political rights. 130 Thirdly, some feminists critique the liberal notion of human rights which focuses on individual rights. 1 31 They argue that women are more inclined towards their families and other social groups.
132 Thus attention to collective rights is necessary. 
Feminist Victories and Critique
In the 199os there were major developments that significantly altered the attitude of international law towards women in societies making the transition to a liberal democracy. 134 While not adopted in relation to transitional justice at all, turning points were marked by several moments including; the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women by the UN General Assembly in December 1993 and Vienna Declaration and Program of Action's emphasis that:
[T]he human rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights," [and that] "Gender -based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated.
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At the same conference feminist also triumphed in their quest for economic, social and cultural rights to be placed at par with civil and political rights when it was declared that:
[A]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. Much more specific to transitional justice, at Beijing in 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women averred in its Platform for Action that:
[I]n addressing armed or other conflicts, an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programmes should be promoted so that before decisions are taken an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively.
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This resolution prompted campaigns for gender mainstreaming in transitional contexts through other platforms. 1 38 The significant success of these lobby efforts was the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1325.139 This Resolution requests particular efforts from the UN Secretary General, member states and those involved in the conflict.
1 40 Apart from requiring that attention ought to be given to gender mainstreaming and gender balance, it also stipulates that certain actions ought to be taken. 141 These include, among others, ensuring increased participation by women in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, and that girl children and women should be protected from gender-related violence. In the same year, the UNSC passed Resolution 1889 which focuses on hindrances to women's participation in peace processes.
1 4 5 It suggests global monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of Resolution 1325, and strengthening both domestic and international reaction to women's concerns in conflict and post-conflict contexts. This was followed by Resolution 196o in armed conflict and provides mechanisms for ending impunity for those who commit sexual violence, including sanctions and reporting mechanisms. 146 This increase in UN resolutions confirms the importance of gender to the transitional justice discourse. Dianne Otto has however noted that the UNSC may be selectively engaging with feminist ideas and that international legal protection of women may in fact reinforce patriarchy.
1 47 Nonetheless, she cautions that:
[I]t is always dangerous to challenge dominant forms of power, ideas and ways of doing (postcolonial or post-colonial) has been subject to serious rancour. 1 52 The major objection to the use of the moniker has been the claim that the alleged former colonies are still colonies. Such assertions can be very compelling as they confirm the evident resurgent neo-imperialism. However, this work's view is that former colonies are no longer really colonies since;
[T]hey have their own governments, which in most cases appear vastly different from the colonial regime. These new governments may represent improvements, new hope, or terrible disappointments, but they are not the same. The newly liberated nations may be ravaged by corruption, violence, and disease, and those horrors may be the direct or indirect result of having been colonized --and that is the subject for investigation by postcolonial studies, not a denial of their value.
53
The history of colonialism and the current experiences of neo-colonialism have made postcolonial legal scholars overtly conscious of interstate power relations and the manner in which any intended international norm will, in reality impact on the administration of power. Indeed as a result of the thinking of these ground-breaking postcolonial theorists some concepts have become associated with and perceived in a certain way in postcolonialism. 56 For example, whereas 'discourse' in linguistics simply refers to any segment of dialogue which is more than a sentence, in postcolonial studies the term is associated with Foucault's enunciations.
1 57
Foucault saw discourse as a firmly circumscribed scope of knowledge, a philosophy with which the world can be recognised. This nexus between power and knowledge is essential in interactions between former colonies and their colonial masters, and was seized by firstgeneration postcolonial legal theorists who explained how traditional understanding of international human rights law (in common with other facets of international law) imbricate with colonial needs. 160 They specifically blamed international law for rendering legitimacy to the imperialists' objectives of subjugating the colonized and systematically pillaging their resources.
16 1 From this theoretical angle, a deceitful positivist myth of sovereign equality which assumes that all states are the principal actors of international law who are bound by international human rights norms that they have freely and voluntarily consented to was rejected.
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In his expostulation of Orientalism, Edward Said builds on Foucault's understanding of discourse to connect culture and imperialism.
16 3 He points out that during the enlightenment period the western discourse assisted the Occident to construct, embody and prevail over the Orient. 1 6 4 In postcolonial studies, Orientalism has come to be understood as a way in which western culture and stereotypes reinforce global depictions of non-western cultures. The effect is not only felt in political and economic structures and institutions but in the creation of a binary fashion of seeing the colonialists as the self and the colonised as the other who need civilisation.
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Drawing on Edward Said's theory, Antony Anghie asserted that most of international law's core doctrines are a product of efforts by European jurists to legally account for the imperial distinctions between the civilised European world and the non-civilised non-European world. 16 [T]hese representations of the European self, and the contrasting non-European other, form the basis of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion and are grounded on differences or similarities of religion, culture or race.
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In a global order that classifies nations as developing and developed, modern and pre-modern and as inhabiting different worlds, human rights norms are seen to be the new yardstick that have ousted civilisation as the postcolonial test for separating the Selffrom the Other. 170 Commenting on the realisation that the majority of cases that are being dealt with by human rights bodies are from postcolonial countries Makau Mutua had this to say:
[I]t is in this sense that the "other culture", that which is non-European, is the savage in the human rights corpus and discourse ....... Many are women and children twice victimised because of their gender and age, and sometimes the victim of the savage culture is the female gender itself.
171
Indeed in relying on an overly generalized victim subject mostly representative of Western privileged women's concerns, the women's human rights movement has been critiqued for its hegemonic bias. 172 According to this viewpoint, postcolonial women are largely depicted as victims of their societal bad cultural practices. 173 This approach bolsters stereotyped and racist images of that culture favouring Western culture. Notwithstanding, its compelling articulation of discursive colonialism, Orientalism tends to represent an exceedingly general and fixed western cultural imperialist notion.
1 74 In particular, it tends to relegate the Other to a mere end result of the colonizer's discourse. This tendency is manifested, for example, in Said's assertions that 'orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought and action'.1 In view of this difficulty, Homi Bhabha seized upon Orientalism to point out the ambivalent relationship that exists between the Self and the Other. 176 His philosophy basically unsettles the definitive power of colonial superiority since it disrupts the uncomplicated relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. 177 First coined in psychoanalysis, the term 'ambivalence' illustrates a constant alteration between desiring something and desiring its antithesis. 178 Applied to postcolonial discourse theory by Homi Bhabha, the term depicts the love and hate relationship that exists between the colonizer and the colonized. 179 For example while some colonial subjects struggled against colonialism, others collaborated with the colonizer and yet the actions of other colonized subjects alternate between complicity and resistance. 180 On the same note, while the colonizer's objective is to create deferential liegeman who 'mimic' the colonizer, it creates fluctuating subjects whose replication of the colonizer's expectations, attitudes and ideals is far-removed from mockery.
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According to Bhabha, the execution of colonial power is weakened by the process's perpetual ambivalence.
182 This is evident in that even though the colonizer's sets out to impose his own values on the colonized, he does not really intend to produce precise mimics. 18 3 Reproducing exact clones is scary since it would disrupt the notion of alterity-the distinction between the self and the other which is necessary for the colonizer to be identified as master. 18 4 To explain this ambivalent process in the exercise of colonial power Bhabha formulated the term 'hybrid.' 18 5 He gives a classic example of Charles Hunt's bid to covert Indians to Christianity in 1792. 186 Charles Grant wanted Indians to adopt Christian beliefs but was afraid that this could stir a liberation rebellion thus he mixed the Christian tenets with factious caste practices.
187
'Hybridity' or the engagement by the colonizer with the culture of the colonized thus disrupts the exceedingly general and fixed western cultural imperialist notion. 
199) Ibid.
200) Bhabha, supra n. 191 at 37.
It should be pointed out that Bhabha is emphatic that colonialism is said to have pronounced the distinction between the former colonial powers and their former colonies thus it is hopeless to attempt to recover the pre-colonial identity. 20 1 For this reason he is wary of any attempts at directly confronting the dominant discourse as the product is likely to be reverse Orientalism and racism or a replacement of one authority with another. 20 2 Concurring with this line of reasoning Bart Moore-Gilbert argues for a form of agency which disrupts the master's discourse from within. prove that the encounter between the European and the non-European world contributed to the creation of the core principles of international law; thereby unsettling the notion that international law is a sole product of European Thirdly, postcolonial scholars sought opportunities of agency within the international legal machinery. Believing that concerns of the newly-liberated states could be addressed through the United Nations (U.N) system, they contended that General Assembly resolutions imposed legal obligations on member states. 210 This strategy was employed in attempts to address several issues, 201) See Kapoor, supra n.189 at 652 and an analogous argument in Spivak, supra n. 19 at 291. 202) Kapoor, supra n. 189. including, the end of colonialism, racial discrimination, sovereign equality of states and non-intervention by powerful states in the affairs of the new states.
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Having succeeded in spearheading the decolonization process, they noted that political independence without economic liberation was insufficient. 212 Therefore, they wishfully sought to re-order the uneven economic relations between the North and the South through the inauguration of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
3
In spite of this ambitious attempt the gap between the rich and the poor widened and the NIEO vision collapsed with the end of the Cold war in 1989.214 It can be argued that the failure of the NIEO illustrates Bhabha's notion that agency and subjectivity are closely connected. Indeed, several underpinnings of the NIEO ideology qualify the ideas of agency and subjectivity.
Firstly, the NIEO demonstrates an attempt by the Other to radically force transformation of international law on the Selfwho play a significant role in the market economy. This can be assumed from the voting patterns at the adoption of the General Assembly resolutions which proclaimed the New International Economic Order. 2 15 The NIEO declaration and the Program of Action were adopted without a vote. 216 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States were passed by a recorded vote of 120 affirmative votes, six opposing and lo abstentions. This differs from the quest for decolonization and national self-determination which was steeped in Western liberal thought and was achieved with the tacit support of the Self Indeed, no colonial power voted against the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which was passed with 89 affirmative votes and nine abstentions. 218 Former colonial masters were not wary of political independence since they had already arranged the structures of the market economy in such a way that territorial and economic strength were divorced. 219 As the then spokesman of the developing nations, President Boumedienne of Algeria aptly put it:
[I]n fact the colonialist and imperialist powers accepted the principle of the right of the peoples to self-determination only when they had already succeeded in setting up the institutions and machinery that would perpetuate that system of pillage established in the colonial era...
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Consequently the binary divisions of the self and the other produced by the colonial encounter were preserved since after political liberation, former colonial masters still controlled the international economic and trading systems. Developing nations which continued to be the source of cheap raw materials were still dependent on the industrialized West for capital, finished products and technology. Secondly, this NIEO strategy was founded on the notion that socially generated resources and knowledge ought to be socially distributed. 2 23 This highlights a suspicious attitude towards international law by developing countries and a refusal to accept capitalist ideas of trade by the same.
224 Inherent is such a viewpoint was a recognition of the hypocritical nature of colonialism. 225 This was tantamount to outright rejection of the Western discourse as a philosophical basis, a move that Bhabha warns against. Against this backdrop Eric, A. Engle, argues that any transformation of the current economic arrangements will be effected progressively within the Bretton Woods institutions. It is axiomatic from the discussion above that in the era of the NIEO; postcolonial legal scholars backed the postcolonial state in furtherance of its nation building responsibility. 227 To them, sovereignty was negative, inhered in the newly liberated state and gave the state a right to be liberated from foreign interference. 228 The state was seen as unitary, ideal body unaffected by class, race, tribal or gender related disagreements. 229 As a result of this viewpoint, there was no focus on the postcolonial state' authoritarianism, neither was there any interrogation of its failure to provide governance.
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The post -NIEO era saw an end to postcolonial wars that had been previously exacerbated by the superpowers' Cold War. 231 It also saw a rise in pro-democracy movements who were either engaged in constitutional reengineering in the passage from war or to peace or were calling upon the postcolonial state to respect its citizenry's wider human rights. 232 In the contemporary era of globalization such struggles has become an acceptable model for the rule of law.
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For postcolonial legal philosophers, these developments necessitated a shift from absolutist notions of state sovereignty to a revised idea of sovereignty which emanate from the will of the people and is related to people's rights, even though their elected representatives might exercise it. 234 Understood in this way, sovereignty allows for intervention in a state's domestic affairs for grave human rights atrocities. 235 It affirms the view that the state has rights as well as obligations and that these responsibilities may be enforced by both its citizens' struggles for civil liberties and by the international community's techniques for humanitarian intervention 236 International law can therefore be invoked in the event of a state's failure to provide good governance so as to ensure that the people's right to democratic entitlement is protected, respected and fulfilled.
2 37 This tendency to resort to human rights and humanitarian law in the aftermath of war or authoritarianism homogenizes a broad study of 227) Anghie and Chimni, supra n. 6 at 82. Ibid. humanitarian justice establishing a legal corpus related to prevalent conflictthe transitional justice discourse.
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Postcolonial theory and TransitionaiJustice
Efforts to construct a postcolonial understanding of the role of international law in a transitional context inevitably leads to an exploration of the extent to which the transitional justice discourse is bedeviled with the umbra of international law's complicit in facilitating imperialism. This is more-so in the current context of globalization and the war of terrorism where power and fundamental relationships which are entrenched and depicted in international law are undergoing much scrutiny. 239 It is distinctly regrettable that these budding critiques of transitional justice unpretentiously mimeo the precepts of colonialism. 240 Indeed axioms of imperialism are liable to be repeated in the use of international law in a transitional context.
First, in as much as international law is indicted for facilitating imperialism's civilizing mission the purpose of which was to emphasize control and power through knowledge formulation and the cultural creation of 'otherness,' the same can be said of the role of law in transitional justice. 241 This can be inferred from the observation that:
[I] n the context of the ongoing violence in the international system, it is significant that since the beginnings of international law, it is frequently the 'other' the non-European tribes, infidels, barbarians who are identified as the source of all violence .... However, this violence when administered by the colonial power is legitimate because it is inflicted in self-defence or because it is humanitarian in character and indeed seeks to save the nonEuropean peoples from themselves. Indeed the ghost of the civilizing mission was revived when terms like 'democratization' and ' human rights' were used to produce knowledge of a pre-invasion Iraq which was in turmoil and in need of the coalition's intervention for its liberation.
2 45 This is noteworthy from George W Bush 2003 remarks that:
In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are also working together to build a democracy and after three decades of tyranny, this work is not easy. The former dictator ruled by terror and treachery, and left deeply ingrained habits of fear and distrust. Remnants of his regime, joined by foreign terrorists, continue their battle against order and against civilization.
246
In a similar vein, and with regard to postcolonial women, Anne Orford borrows Gatayri Spivak's famous adage 'white women ... saving brown women from brown men' as she notes how certain feminist legal literature sees the role of international law and 'white women' as being the liberation of third world women from their cultures. 247 According to this school of thought international law must set out to reform these savage cultures so that there can mimic those of powerful countries.'
248
Secondly, it could be said that almost all the key concepts associated with transitional justice -democratization, liberalization and rule of law-denote a progression from the Occident to the Orient. 249 They imply the transformation of certain values that have professedly been developed by the untainted benevolent selfand must now be embraced by the other if it is to make a successful transition to an internationally acceptable liberal democracy.
250
A Orford, 'Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law' (2002) There are also based on the racist stereotypes of the postcolonial people as devoid of any philosophy for reconstructing their communities. 251 These nuances can be deciphered from the then, Britain's Prime Minister, Tony Blair's address to the U.S. Congress in 2003. 252 In his remark, he dismissed critiques that liberty, democracy and human rights are Western values and assertions that Serbian citizens, the Iraq people and the women of Afghanistan were content under the leadership of their outgoing regimes. 253 In accordance to Tony Blair the US and its coalition's values are:
[n]ot Western values, they are the universal values of the human spirit. And anywhere..., anytime ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the choice is the same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law, not the rule of the secret police... And just as the terrorist seeks to divide humanity in hate, so we have to unify it around an idea. And that idea is liberty. We must find the strength to fight for this idea and the compassion to make it universal. 254 In the current context where those initiatives are entangled in intricate issues of power, efforts at making those values 'universal' are likely to be viewed with cynicism. 255 As the cases of the ouster of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi demonstrates, while those universal values stipulate that institutions and practices which are inimical to human rights must be transformed, use of force which justifies the reconstruction of a less powerful society by definition also necessitates imposition of the victor's justice.
Furthermore, given transitional justice's relation to the western view that the individual is the principal holder of rights in tandem with its marginalization of economic, social and cultural rights, the values it transmit cannot be said to be universal. 256 Postcolonial Africa for example, accords economic social and cultural the same status as an individual's civil and political rights 257 The Eurocentric notion cannot also adequately account for the multifariousness of group and individual rights in a postcolonial state. 258 This attitude also testify to the masculinity of transitional justice since as a social class, women are the conventional care givers who are more directly affected by a state's failure to respect, protect and fulfil its citizens' economic, social and cultural rights.
259
Thirdly, international law's inattention to a historic fact that in most cases, postcolonial authoritarianism and violence was sustained and maintained by external historic and prevailing processes attracts criticism that transitional justice serves to deflect attention from and entrench impunity for human rights atrocities committed by former colonial powers' violence. Fourth, in giving tacit approval to economic exploitative practices which often occur alongside the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, and for both to be given legitimacy as the promotion of liberal democracy by the international community, international law can be charged with advancing neo-colonial projects of economic exploitation. 268 A recent example of this phenomenon is the Western expropriation of Iraq's resources and assets after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
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As Anne Orford questioned with regard to the analogous case of Afghanistan;
[H] ow did it come to seem almost remarkable, in the aftermath of a'war on terror, to be told in November 2001 that the government of Afghanistan was being' freely determined' by its people in Bonn, while the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program and the Asian Development Bank co-hosted a meeting in Islamabad to decide how to transform Afghanistan into a market economy.
270
The occupying powers privatised Iraq in a manner which could be seen as a violation of the Iraq citizenry's international legal right to self-determination. 271 This process, which was undertaken without the consent of the Iraq people, included giving Western investors the power to control almost all Iraq companies without any profit repatriation terms. 272 The Iraq oil industry was also placed under the control of an independent professional management 273 These programs were based on the understanding that a regime administered under a free-market democracy paradigm would not be authoritarian or compelled to purchase weapons of mass destruction. 274 It may primafacie appear unproblematic that transitional justice and free market capitalism have a complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship. This is because both practices purportedly set out to spread and improve human rights norms. 275 According to liberals, as multinational enterprises operate globally within the system of free trade and investment they progressively impart human rights values in transitional societies. 27 6 To illustrate, the rule of law which is essential for the development of both the free market and democracy is enforced to ensure certainty in legislation which relates to foreign investment and the general conduct of business. 277 In particular, primacy is given to an individual's right to property and sanctity of contract. 278 This legal certainty results in greater foreign investment leading to domestic economic growth which will be instrumental in, or lead to an unavoidable socialisation of human rights norms and usher a democratic regime.
279
A close postcolonial legal scrutiny of this relationship however, reveals that it is paradoxical that transitional justice discourses purport to move citizens from an unjust regime to a just establishment while embracing the notion of free markets.
28 0 This is because the argument that free market capitalism's contributes towards the promotion of people's welfare has been largely disproved. 281 In fact postcolonial legal theorists have pointed out that international financial institutions' structural adjustment and trade liberalization policies' insensitivity to budgetary actualities of postcolonial states weaken the economic, social and cultural rights of people in these societies. Despite recent international legal recognition that non-state actors can be perpetrators of human rights atrocities, transitional jurisprudence has only embraced this notion in as far as it relates to civil and political rights violated by armed rebels. 284 This inattention to international economic institutions and multinational companies' well documented contribution to the humanitarian crisis and human rights atrocities of outgoing regimes further reinforce the argument that there is complicity between the practice of transitional justice and the neo-liberal practices of economic exploitation. 285 However, none of these compelling postcolonial critiques of transitional justice celebrate post-colonial African leadership's mismanagement and corruption which exacerbated the colonial legacy of inequalities they failed to address as a prerequisite to independence. 28 6 They also do not totally dismiss transitional jurisprudence as an extension of the civilizing mission, cultural imperialism or a promotion of neo-colonial practices of economic exploitation.
287
To reiterate, Homi Bhabha has eloquently pronounced that civilizing projects are undermined by the ambivalent representation of colonial power. 28 8 A postcolonial legal understanding could therefore also endeavor to unsettle the contradiction between the Occident and the Orient, by interrogating the crucial connivance between the conditions in which the other is produced in transitional jurisprudence, and the self that is circumstantially produced. 289 In scrutinizing treatises on transitional justice, this work has already highlighted the analogy between the construction of the benevolent, valorous, masculine self of the international actors and the other against whom justice' mechanisms ought to be employed so as to diffuse 'universal values'. 290 Yet, authoritative texts on transitional justice are outlined in a similar manner. 291 For example, Professor Ruti Teitel's analysis of the genealogy of transitional justice marks the discourse's key historical epochs as the period after Second World War, the post-Cold War era and the contemporary period of globalization which is distinct for its persistent conflict. 292 It is remarkable that in the period after the Second World War former colonial powers were involved in conflicts aimed at suppressing anti-colonial movements as well as preventing the expansion of Communism. 293 After the Cold war, these operations gained prominence in postcolonial societies as armies of the super powers increasingly turned to global peacekeeping and policing activities. 294 It is noteworthy that in these interventionist activities, western powers have been implicated in conduct which the field of transitional justice associates with the inhuman acts of 'rogue' authoritarian leaders of outgoing regimes. 295 To use Anne Oxford's words; [T] hat with which we charge the other -that it founds a masculinity, racially exclusionary, violent and nationalist political order on the expulsion and wounding of women and children is in fact the basis of the international community as constituted through intervention narratives. The attempts to disavow this leads to more violence. 296 This demonstrates that the practice of transitional justice is not a one-way process in which 'rogue' leaders of 'failed' states are either sanctioned or reconstituted in the image of an untainted benevolent international community. 297 Rather, and to borrow from Homi Bhaba's exposition on the ambivalence of the colonial exchange, an inevitable consequence of this contradictory colonial exchange is the occurrence of hybridity which creates opportunities for the appropriation of the powerful imperial knowledge for anti-colonial resistance purposes.
298 These counter-colonial projects draw upon various local and hybrid practices to challenge, undermine and occasionally supplant the authority of the colonial discourse. A classic example of this hybridity and agency is the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) which emerged as a simultaneous reaction to dictatorship in postcolonial Africa and a site for resisting all 292) Teitel, supra n. io8. 298) Bhabha, supra n. 177, at 85-92. Ibid. kinds of imperialism. 30 0 At its birth, the African Charter was seen as unconventional since it went further than embracing an individualistic universal rights notion to also incorporate collective rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. 30 [T]he uniqueness of the African situation and the special qualities of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights impose upon the African Commission an important task. International law and human rights must be responsive to African circumstances. Clearly, collective rights, environmental rights and economic and social rights are essential elements of human rights in Africa. 30 2 It is submitted that by engaging with and considering that features of African traditions and the values of the continent's civilization can be its foundation, the Charter undermines the original civilizing mission of human rights.
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These developments however, do not obliterate the critique that because of its liberal bias, the transitional justice discourse may not be an appropriate tool for dealing with the postcolonial world's injustices. 30 4 Underlying tenets of liberalism do not amply consider these societies' political, economic and cultural conditions. A postcolonial legal reading could however, attempt to strike a balance between the need to decolonize humanitarian legal and human rights standards which form the normative basis of transitional justice, on the one hand, and a recognition that these international legal standards can be both viperous and redeeming. 30 6 Further, and against the backdrop that globalization has reconfigured, disrupted and destabilized the notion of the sovereign state, postcolonial legal scholarship can also engage with non-state actors and other locations of power so as to holistically address rights and sites that concern injustices perpetrated on postcolonial subjects and women. 
Conclusion: Feminism, Postcolonial Legal Theory and Transitional Justice
Feminists and postcolonial scholars share a fundamental suspicion of the preoccupation with transitions to a peaceful liberal democratic order as this tends to reverse gender equality gains and confirm a traditional public/private divide. They both direct their criticisms at the discourse's foundational concepts, namely, rule of law, liberalism, democracy and human rights. 308 According to them, the liberal notions of democracy, rule of law and human rights were invented by an authoritarian system. For radical feminists, this dominant group is the patriarchal society and for postcolonial legal theorists, it is their former colonial masters. Both focus on the rights of a group and not necessarily on individual rights. Both theorists are critical of the traditional practice of privileging civil and political rights at the expense of economic, social and cultural rights. They differ though, in that feminists do not share the absolute positive attitude that post colonialists seem to have towards the collective, noting that groups can also be sites of abuse.
Thus this article has endeavored to directly weld the transitional justice discourse to the imperial origins and bias of international law. It has also problematized transitional justice's liberal basis. The observation it makes is that in their conventional form, transitional justice mechanisms may not adequately deal with the postcolonial world's injustices since postcolonial legal theorists and feminists have shown that liberal core values do not neatly fit into the societies' peculiar, socio-economic and political contexts. Previous authors have either ignored this connection or merely footnoted the colonial legacy. It is this author's assumption that this is because most of these scholars are largely steeped in liberal thought and are therefore eager to dismiss arguments of a cultural relativist nature as detraction and an exploitation of culture by dictators and their supporters. Yet most of these pundits concur that legitimacy is central to linking transitional justice processes to sustainable peace.
Inspired by feminists and postcolonial legal theorists, who largely draw on literary studies this thesis submits that Eurocentric views cannot however, be limited to the colonial context and thus rejected. Nor should they be removed from this historic context and thus written off. Therefore, while transitional justice can be seen as one of the human rights strategies that are reminiscent of imperial intervention in the lives of postcolonial subjects, it is open to seizure by the same. This is possible in a transitional context since these 308) Ibid. situations create opportunities for stakeholders to rethink the inadequacies of the accepted discourse, and to subscribe to new ways of seeking justice. Therefore, in applying postcolonial legal thinking to transitional justice this paper exposed the field's dominating ream in its usance so as to simultaneously inaugurate its liberating potential.
